DON\u27T BITE THE BAIT: PHISHING ATTACK FOR INTERNET BANKING (E-BANKING) by Kara, ilker
Journal of Digital Forensics, 
Security and Law 
Volume 16 Article 5 
11-8-2021 
DON'T BITE THE BAIT: PHISHING ATTACK FOR INTERNET 
BANKING (E-BANKING) 
ilker Kara 
Cankiri Karatekin University, karaikab@gmail.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/jdfsl 
 Part of the Computer Law Commons, Digital Communications and Networking Commons, and the 
Information Security Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kara, ilker (2021) "DON'T BITE THE BAIT: PHISHING ATTACK FOR INTERNET BANKING (E-BANKING)," 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law: Vol. 16 , Article 5. 
Available at: https://commons.erau.edu/jdfsl/vol16/iss2/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Journals at Scholarly Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Digital Forensics, 
Security and Law by an authorized administrator of 




DON’T BITE THE BAIT: PHISHING
ATTACK FOR INTERNET BANKING
(E-BANKING)
Ilker Kara
Department of Medical Services and Techniques, Eldivan Medical Services Vocational School
Çankırı, Karatekin University, Turkey
karaikab@gmail.com
ABSTRACT
Phishing attacks are based on obtaining desired information from users quickly and easily
with the help of misdirection, panic, curiosity, or excitement. Most phishing websites are
designed on internet banking(e-banking), and the attackers can acquire financial information
of misled users with the tactics and discourses they develop. Despite the increase of prevention
techniques against phishing attacks day by day, an effective solution could not be found for
this issue due to the human factor. Because of this reason, attackers’ attack techniques and
strategies from actual phishing attacks are essential to study and analyze. This study focused
on the detection and analysis of a real e-banking phishing attack using the phishing website.
Analysis results show that the attacker’s information is traceable.
Keywords: Mobile phishing, Phishing website, Phishing attacks analysis, e-banking phishing,
Cyber security, Forensic analysis
1. INTRODUCTION
The phishing attack is an attack-type that is
intended to retrieve the victim’s personal in-
formation (social media username, password,
bank account number, username, etc.) in the
network environment. The attack concept is
as old as human history. Its purpose, appli-
cation varieties, and techniques have contin-
uously developed, becoming a more complex
and difficult problem to solve today. Improve-
ments in technology and rapid increase in its
usage have brought improved attack risk in
attack types and techniques, and it has also
increased the exposure to cybercrime. The
word "phishing" itself is a combination of the
words "password" and "fishing." Phishing
attacks were first seen in the early 2000s.
According to Brand et al. (2010), phish-
ing attacks have become a cyber-attack tool
developed to deceive and defraud users by us-
ing fake websites, fake emails, and malware,
and today it is used virtually. According to
Retruster’s published report, millions of peo-
ple have been affected by phishing attacks,
and 90% of data breaches use this method
Retruster (2019).
The literature shows that phishing attack
scenarios happen in three stages: attack
preparation, attack method, and phishing at-
tacks (See Fig 1). Attackers get through the
exhaustive preparation phase before the at-
tack. In the attack preparation phase, the at-
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Figure 1. Commonly employed phishing at-
tacks in the literature.
tacker determines the target group and plans
an attack for that group. After choosing a
target according to their motivation, they be-
gin to gather information about the targets.
They aim to increase the success rate for
their phishing attack in an organized and sys-
tematized way. They collect information by
exploiting people’s vulnerabilities, especially
social media accounts, mail addresses, family,
friends, and even people unrelated to the tar-
get. Social media accounts or mail addresses
are indispensable data sources. Current po-
litical or social events and their effects on the
people are also used in the data collection
phase.
In the attack method phase, attackers use
malware attached to emails, fake web pages,
etc. Web-based phishing attacks use an
email containing a malicious link or web page,
which at first glance appears to be from a cor-
porate company, to reach the attacker’s vic-
tims Dhanalakshmi and Chellappan (2010);
Meghanathan et al. (2010). The suspicious
email is aimed at obtaining important infor-
mation about the victim. The discourse and
tactics developed by the attackers are aimed
at confusing and bringing emotions to the
forefront. Digital forensics experts examine
digital evidence, such as suspicious emails, to
identify criminal elements Dhanalakshmi et
al. (2011).
According to Das et al. (2018), reducing
phishing attacks using safety tools and user-
specific warnings can prevent attacks in the
preparation phase. Despite these measures,
the surprising variety of end-users and their
roles in this process could not be understood.
One of the most common methods used in
phishing attacks is to reach users via email
and notifications that will cause panic, cu-
riosity, and excitement in them Jolly (2016).
If the user clicks on the malware in the email
attachment or the link which belongs to a
fake web page, the user will be redirected to
a tricky web page that looks like one of the
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legitimate institutions or a bank (Basit et al.,
2020).
According to Chaudhry et al. (2016), it has
been pointed out that in many detected phish-
ing attacks, especially the keylogger type mal-
ware, the email attachment is preferred by
attackers to capture the user’s passwords.
In the last few years, one of the most threat-
ening phishing attacks has been an attack
that aims at internet banking. The attacker
aims to deceive the people they reach by
clicking a fake link that enables the target
person to enter their information in the rel-
evant sections in this link. Because of this
careless and rushed process, the attacker will
be able to retrieve all necessary information
for internet banking. The attacker designs
these web pages to be difficult to distinguish
from the relevant pages of the institution or
organization they are imitating Chanajitt et
al. (2018). When the users visit these web
pages designed by the attackers to mimic e-
banking pages for financial gain, they may
seem almost identical to the current view
of the relevant bank’s page Aburrous et al.
(2010); Junger et al. (2017).
At the time of the attack, the victim is
performing e-banking activities, while the at-
tacker is between the customer and the bank,
and the customers use their online banking
accounts Adham et al. (2013); Hertzum et
al. (2004).
According to Gan et al. (2008), e-banking
attacks have been arranged via a fake web
page link for Malaysian Computer Emergency
ResponseTeam or MyCERT. According to
this report, there were 3 cases in 2000, 106
cases in 2004, and 364 cases in 2007, and it
was noted that such attacks increased dra-
matically. After the phishing attack phase
has been completed, the attacker does not
achieve its purpose by obtaining the financial
and personal information of the user. Later,
these users’ passwords, social media accounts,
financial data may be used to collect money
or perform financial frauds such as trans-
ferring funds and purchasing goods through
electronic commerce Hertzum et al. (2004).
New methods are being developed to fight
against this crime. Otrok et al. (2014), to pre-
vent phishing attacks, a method was proposed
that includes programming to invalidate ac-
cess permissions in suspicious transactions; it
cannot prevent attacks due to the possibility
of benefiting from this method and human
factors, and these attacks are still a major
threat. Considering all of these, in this study,
we present an approach that shows how to
detect and analyze phishing attacks. For this
purpose, this study mainly presents four con-
tributions:
• This study focuses on phishing attacks
against e-banking and provides an ap-
proach to how to examine the detection
and analysis of these attacks.
• For this purpose, a phishing attack case
for real e-banking has been selected, the
attack detection and analysis have been
examined, and the results have been eval-
uated.
• To be more precise, we evaluated the
working mechanism of the phishing web-
site designed, the processes performed,
and the forensic analysis for the phishing
attack.
• In the light of the obtained analysis re-
sults, we saw that the attacker was trace-
able and evaluated the contribution of
phishing website analysis to forensic in-
vestigations.
This article is organized as follows: in
section 2, we have reviewed some relevant
studies. In section 3, we performed a case
detection and analysis for a real e-banking
phishing attack. In section 4 presents an eval-
uation of the approach used. Lastly, section
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5 completes the work and explains possible
solutions to fight against phishing attacks




In the present day, there are many studies
in the field of phishing attack detection and
analysis. In this section, some of these stud-
ies, especially on analysis for e-banking, have
been briefly reviewed.
Wardman et al. (2014), in the study they
did in 2010, presented a dataset consisting of
URLs to these organizations that were tar-
geted by phishing attacks against e-banking.
The attackers mentioned that they created
88,331 URLs and various websites associated
with them to organize e-banking phishing at-
tacks against the target organizations. As
a result of the study, they argued that to
fight against a phishing attack, these web-
sites designed specifically for e-banking and
phishing attacks can be detected and blocked
with techniques such as URL information.
According to Dhamija and Tygar (2005), the
attackers usually use web-based applications
to organize e-banking phishing attacks to
profit; in addition to that, users have em-
phasized that these websites are too difficult
to distinguish from a real application. They
stated that to prevent these attacks; the com-
panies should use e-banking applications that
minimize the risk by considering this threat.
Kshetri (2006) has analyzed the cost-
benefit structure of the attackers and men-
tioned that the existing protection mecha-
nisms are insufficient in detection and anal-
ysis; therefore, research to fight against this
crime should be increased necessarily. In
addition, they explained that the periodic
analysis reports about phishing attacks raise
awareness in society and will pay attention to
this issue. Thus the attackers will be arrested
and discouraged.
In their study, Aburrous et al. (2010) pro-
posed an analysis model using a data set con-
sisting of three case studies of phone phishing,
website phishing, phishing website survey sce-
nario, which they determined for e-banking
phishing attacks. As a result of the study, it
showed that the security systems used in the
study did not show enough awareness for the
users while applying the social engineering
elements of the organized training programs.
According to Kirda and Kruegel (2005),
if the websites used in e-banking phishing
attacks can be detected with the anti-phish
method and detected as soon as confidential
pieces of information such as passwords have
been typed in the forms on these websites,
the pending transactions on these websites
can be canceled before they are being used.
They describe that if the form that they are
filling belongs to an untrusted website and
generates an alert, it would cancel the pend-
ing transaction. This approach is important
to prevent the threat before it occurs by cre-
ating an e-learning model. Unfortunately,
prior knowledge about the target website is re-
quired for the web-based restriction approach
to be applicable. Under these circumstances,
this might not always be available. More
importantly, the success rate is very limited
because the attackers are also aware of this
approach and develop techniques to circum-
vent this detection.
Another similar popular approach is the
URL-based detection of web pages by Ter-
aguchi et al. (2014). This approach is based
on detecting phishing attacks by evaluating
the invalid or hidden URL and preventing the
attack. The disadvantage of this approach
is the attackers create a fake user account at
the login step and hide the real URL.
Herzberg and Gbara (2004) proposed the
"TrustBar" approach to avoid phishing at-
tacks. This approach detects important logos
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and other graphic content on official web-
sites and identifies fake ones. However, this
approach could not accomplish the desired
effective result because the attackers use the
same logos and graphic contents located on
official websites on the fake websites they
develop. The successes are low in this and
similar approaches because the attackers de-
velop methods to circumvent these kinds of
techniques (i.e., web page or URLs such as
blacklist, fraud detection, anti-phishing tool-
bars, or spam filters).
Pan et al. (2006) proposed to first an-
alyze the real identities of websites to de-
tect website-based phishing attacks. For this
purpose, this includes the title, description,
pictures and videos, copyright, etc., on the
website. They assumed that features such as
phishing might be changed by the attacker
while preparing phishing websites. As a result
of the study, it was seen that the proposed
method was unsuccessful at a rate of 29%.
In another study, Yi et al. (2018) proposed
a method for detecting phishing websites de-
signed to steal victims’ usernames, identity in-
formation, and credit card information. The
study aims to detect the IP numbers and
URL addresses of suspicious websites using
deep convolutional neural networks (CNN)
method and to block these websites. In the
study, real data from the ISP (Internet ser-
vice provider) within 24 hours was used as
the data set. As a result of the study, it was




In this section, we introduce the Workstation
and analysis tools used in the analysis. Then,
a real case of e-banking phishing attacks is
described.
3.1 Case Study Dataset
The importance of choosing a well-chosen
and correct case is vital for case study-focused
studies and is a well-known fact. If e-banking
phishing attacks are reviewed, there are a
limited number of data sets available, such
as Aburrous et al. (2010) and Wardman et
al. (2011). In addition, the fact that the case
study to be used in the analysis should be a
real attack case is critical in determining the
detection and analysis approaches. Therefore,
the available datasets were not suitable for
our research.
We collaborated with an information se-
curity company in Turkey to reach such an
appropriate case study. The mentioned com-
pany has a dedicated team and system to col-
lect many phishing attack software samples
(e-banking). They shared the real example of
e-banking phishing attacks with us. Please
note that the selected example is purposed
especially for e-banking phishing attacks.
3.2 Preparation of Analysis
Environment
All analyses were performed on a Dell Pre-
cision T3630 brand Workstation with Xeon
E-2124/8GB/1TB HDD Quadro P620 run-
ning Windows 10 Pro software. The victim
has taken a copy of the cell phone in digi-
tal image E01 format using UFED-Cellebrite
instead of doing a live investigation on the
mobile phone that they were using. Analyz-
ing the live system may involve some risks.
A possible risk is not compromising data in-
tegrity so that the analyses are reproducible
for different people or different analysis envi-
ronments. For this purpose, all analysis has
been performed via digital copy. The digital
image does not change the original data. It
ensures data integrity by verifying the orig-
inal mobile phone information system and
the digital copy obtained with the help of
MD5 (Message-Digest the algorithm, MD5)
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or SHA-1 (Secure Hashing Algorithm, Sha),
Sha-256 hash values (Table 1). Analysis has
been performed in the virtual machine in the
Workstation, using Cellebrite Physical Ana-
lyzer 7.22 tools. Since the selected example
is a real cyberattack and forensic case, some
information has been presented in the study
by hiding.
3.3 Case Study
The victim wishes to perform online bank-
ing transactions on the web page of Is Bank,
and, for this purpose, he is searching for the
word "Isbank" in www.google.com.tr on his
mobile phone and clicking on the link that
he thinks belongs to the e-banking system of
the relevant bank. While he was logged in,
he received an informative message from his
account that $1200 was transferred without
his knowledge. When he checked this suspi-
cious transaction checked in his account, he
saw that the transaction indeed took place
without his knowledge. For this reason, he ap-
plied for a judicial application to investigate
the issue.
For this purpose, images of the victim’s
mobile phone were taken using the UFED-
Cellebrite program, and investigations were
started with the UFED-Cellebrite Analyzer
7.22 program on the Workstation. The in-
ternet records of the victim’s statements of
21.06.2020, which is the date of suspicious
transactions, were examined (see Figure 2).
As shown in Figure 2, a search was
done with the word "ISBANK" on the www.
google.com.tr search engine on the day
of the suspicious event. While the victim
was trying to make an e-banking transac-
tion, it was detected that the domain name
was likened to the official bank address at
first glance and entered the domain http:
//isbanh.com. This domain name was spe-
cially designed for the e-banking phishing at-
tack, and it was concluded that the victim’s e-
banking information had been collected. The
focus of the investigation was to identify the
suspicious web addresses of victims from the
internet records (Figure 3). The screenshot
of the website was given in Figure 3, where
you can look at the access link of the suspi-
cious website and the area where the bank
customers enter their personal information.
HTTrack Website Copier is a website copy
tool that allows you to download the entire
website to the computer and allows the down-
loaded website to be used offline. In order to
examine the suspicious website content, the
suspicious website http://isbanh.com was
downloaded to the Workstation using HT-
Track Website Copier 3.49-2 program, and
the contents of the suspect site were reached
(Figure 4). The folders on the website (1),
the index operator that allows viewing the
offline pages of the internet- (2) and log files
in which the information of the visitors who
enter the field on the website is kept- (3) are
shown in Figure 4.
By running the website’s index operator,
the "view page source" examination of the
site was made (Figure 5).
From the view page source examination
of the suspect http://isbanh.com website,
it was seen that the website was prepared
with word press, and a "MetaWeblog" was
created to write the entries that entered the
website using web services. The log file seen
in the website content was shown (Figure
6). Figure 6 shows the suspicious http://
isbanh.com website log records: the victim
whose personal information was obtained by
the phishing attack (1) and the other victim
whose personal information was obtained by
the phishing attack (2). After the forensic
examination of the suspect website’s content,
it concentrated on accessing the information
of the attacker. Identifying the IP number
of the suspicious website is one of the most
widely used methods to reach the attacker
in forensic investigations. It is the detection
of the suspicious IP number and then the
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Product Name Samsung Galaxy A71
Product ID 326153051670XXX
Operating System Android
Operating System Version Android 10.0
Install Date 10.04.2016 - 10:47:35 UTC
Shutdown Time 17.12.2020 - 07:14:15 UTC
Description Physical Disk, 132.443 Sectors 13,2 GB






Table 1. Device information.
Figure 2. Screenshot of the query of suspect IP address.
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Figure 3. Screenshot of the website’s view suspect http://isbanh.com.
Figure 4. Content of the suspected http://isbanh.com website with the HTTrack Website
Copier program.
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Figure 5. Screenshot of the website’s view suspect http://isbanh.com.
determination of the internet subscriber to
which the IP number is assigned. If this
information is available, it can often provide
the opportunity to track the attacker.
As a result of the analysis, the do-
main name of http://isbanh.com was
seen by accessing with the IP address
"185.45.193.XXX" (See Figure 7). After
determining the type of attack, investiga-
tions focused on the attacker-based infor-
mation thought to be belonging to the at-
tacker in order to reach the attacker. For
this purpose, the domain name "isbanh.com"
and IP address were inquired from the IP,
www.domaintools.com address (See Figure
3). As a result of the query, it was seen
that the information thought to belong to
the attacker was accessible.
4. DISCUSSION
The proposed scheme, similar to Riadi et
al. (2013), is mainly based on detecting and
analyzing phishing attacks with the help of
forensic analysis tools. The content of phish-
ing attacks in this study is identified as a
real case study. The examined example of
e-banking phishing attacks is identified as
a popular type of cyberattack designed to
have financial gain by attackers, which has
been frequently seen recently. Analyses offer
two important advantages, such as (1) the
Figure 6. Screenshot of the website’s view
page source.
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Figure 7. Screenshot of "https://whois.
domaintools.com" query of detected suspect
IP number.
e-banking phishing attack detection and anal-
ysis, and (2) even the attack method used,
to be able to trace the information that is
thought to belong to the attacker. On the
other hand, e-banking phishing attacks analy-
sis has some difficulties. First of all, although
each attack is similar to the others, it can
be designed differently, and the analysis ap-
proach may differ depending on the case. For
this reason, many security professionals are
constantly reviewing the latest attacks or pre-
fer to do open-source research on studies in
this area to deal with this threat. To over-
come this problem, some approaches have
been proposed, such as customizing a web
page as proposed by Emigh (2005), in which
bank and trust companies can send a unique
personalized message to their customers or
upload a photo of the user. They also argued
that the use of personalized web pages could
not imitate the attackers’ deceptive emails or
web pages. These kinds of attempts against
an e-banking phishing attack are hopeful of
fighting against that crime.
Another study, which is closer to a part
of our study, Al Mutawa et al., conducted
a forensic analysis of phishing websites on
smartphones using forensic analysis tools
(UFED-Cellebrite, Wireshark, etc.) Al Mu-
tawa et al. (2012). Although the proposed
method in the study is applicable for similar
forensic cases, they emphasized the necessity
of performing analyses with different models
and brands of smart mobile phones. This
study analyzed and detected real e-banking
phishing attack examples. It was seen that
the information of the attacker was accessi-
ble from the analysis results. Moreover, the
analysis of the real sample selected in the
study showed that the content analysis of
the phishing website, determination of the
attack strategy, and information about the
attacker could be reached. This result shows
that the approach used in the study can be a
suitable method that can be used, especially
in the analysis of phishing web attacks. We
believe this approach needs to be repeated
with more current examples to support this
approach strongly. Another remarkable topic
is the potential of deep learning methods that
we can utilize. As we highlighted in previous
chapters, we believe that achieving high suc-
cess in e-banking phishing attack prevention
can contribute to the problem area.
5. CONCLUSION
In this study, we conducted a study involv-
ing a real case study for e-banking phishing
attack detection and analysis. Furthermore,
the analysis showed that the information of
the attacker was traceable. The approach
used in the study shows that it is an appro-
priate method that can be used in e-banking
phishing attack detection and analysis. We
plan to investigate the analysis platform us-
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ing deep learning methods in e-banking phish-
ing attack detection and analysis in a future
study. We believe that deep convolutional
neural networks (CNN) methods can con-
tribute to large-scale phishing attack detec-
tion and analysis in the problem area. The ra-
tionale behind this argument stems from our
observations of phishing attacks and the focus
of attention mechanisms in modern CNN’s for
where to look in phishing attacks to discover
the most distinctive regions automatically.
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